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INTRODUCTION
In January, 1992, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) designated nearly 6.9 million acres of federal land in
1
Washington, Oregon and northern California as “critical habitat” for
2
the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina (Merriam)).
Acting under a court order, the Service had added the spotted owl to
3
its list of threatened species almost two years earlier. The listing had
been applauded by environmentalists, but it sent waves of panic
through timber-dependent communities in the Pacific northwest,
which had already fallen upon hard times and which could ill afford
further restrictions on logging in areas occupied by the spotted owl.
To most observers, the interests of loggers and spotted owls appeared
4
irreconcilable.
The designation of critical habitat promised to add fuel to a
situation that the Secretary of Interior would later call a “national
5
train wreck.” When the Service initially refused to designate critical
6
habitat for the owl, environmentalists dragged it back to federal dis1. The Endangered Species Act defines critical habitat as those areas with physical or
biological features which are determined to be “(i) essential to the conservation of the species
and (ii) which may require special management considerations or protection.” 16 U.S.C.
§1532(5)(A) (1994). For further discussion of critical habitat, see infra notes 111-127 and accompanying text.
2. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Critical Habitat
for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
3. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Finding on Northern Spotted Owl
Petition, 52 Fed. Reg. 48, 552 (1987) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Northern Spotted Owl
v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (finding the determination of the FWS to be arbitrary and capricious); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Threatened
Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,666, 26,670 (1989) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened
Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26, 114 (1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F. R.
pt. 17).
4. See, e.g., Owls v. Man, TIME, June 25, 1990, at 2, 56-63; Jorge Casuso, Owl Decision
Leaves Town in Anguish, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1990, at C1; Brad Knickerbocker, Oregon’s
Other Threatened Species: The Timber Worker, CHRIST. SCI. MON., Aug. 9, 1990, at 10; John
Howard, Closing of Its Timber Mill Drives a Stake Into the Heart of Hayfork, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
5, 1992, at B3. This pessimistic view has been questioned more recently; see, e.g., Timothy
Egan, Oregon, Foiling Forecasters, Thrives as It Protects Owls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1994, at
A1.
5. The phrase was used by Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and widely quoted in the
media. See, e.g., Eric Pryne, An Ounce of Prevention: Restoration Touted as Way to Save Wildlife Before it is Endangered, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 21, 1993, at A1.
6. When the FWS listed the spotted owl as threatened, it had stated that it could not determine its critical habitat without further study. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,124 (1990) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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trict court, where a judge ordered the agency to promptly make a
7
designation. Once compelled to act, the Service did not approach
the critical habitat designation as a task to be undertaken lightly.
The Service is required by statute to determine critical habitat “on
the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into
consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of
8
specifying any particular area as critical habitat.” To fulfill this
mandate, the Service solicited data and comments from the public on
all aspects of its proposal, from technical issues in conservation biol9
ogy to the economic impact of the proposed habitat designation.
The final published rule was the outcome of an arduous nine month
process, during which the Service held eight public hearings and re10
sponded to hundreds of written comments.
Before publishing a final rule, the Service carefully considered
the economic impact of its proposed action. Initially it had called for
more than 11.6 million acres of federal, state and private land to be
11
designated as critical habitat. It later revised that proposal to in12
clude only 8.2 million acres, and its final rule designated only 6.9
13
million acres, all of it managed by federal agencies. The Service estimated that the final acreage reduction would save approximately
1,000 jobs and return 65 million board feet to the timber base annu14
ally. Nevertheless, many residents and local government officials
were unhappy with the final rule because of its projected impact on
15
local economies.

7. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 630 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(ordering the FWS to publish a final rule “at the earliest possible time permitted under the appropriate regulations”).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
9. See id. § 1533(b)(4)-(6). After issuing its proposed rule, the Service accepted public
comments for 30 days. It then issued a revised proposed rule, on which it accepted comments
for an additional 60 days.
10. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Determination of Critical
Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 56 Fed. Reg. 20, 816 (1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 17); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Proposed Determination of
Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,002 (1991)(to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17).
11. See 56 Fed. Reg. 20,816 (1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
12. See 56 Fed. Reg. 40,002 (1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
13. See 57 Fed. Reg. 1796, 1809 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
14. See id. at 1808.
15. To avoid imposing excessive economic hardship on individual counties, the Service
excluded areas in which a designation of critical habitat would result in at least a 3 percent decline to the timber industry. In addition, it excluded areas where the designation would result
in a projected loss to county budgets of 5 percent or more. See id. at 1807. Still, the overall
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Spurred by local discontent, the commissioners of Douglas
County, Oregon decided to challenge the critical habitat designation
16
in federal court. Ironically, the county commissioners did not complain about the impact the designation would have on local economies or otherwise challenge the substance of the critical habitat designation. Rather, the county claimed that the Fish and Wildlife
Service had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the
17
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The county’s argument was novel, and perhaps disingenuous—NEPA, after all, has
most commonly been invoked to force agencies to examine the environmental impact of federal actions which physically add to, delete
18
from, or otherwise modify the natural landscape. Douglas County,
in contrast, wanted the Fish and Wildlife Service to comply with
NEPA before taking an action which was specifically intended to
preserve a natural resource and thereby enhance environmental
quality. For obvious reasons, Douglas County’s argument appealed
to persons who believe that environmental laws have unnecessarily
stalled economic development, pinched industry profits, and in19
fringed upon the autonomy of state and local governments. If valiregional impact of the designation was likely to be significant. The Service predicted that federal timber revenues would decline by $50 million, that county revenues from federal timber
sales would decline by more than $18 million, and that some 1,400 timber-related jobs would be
lost. See id. at 1816-18.
16. The commissioners’ primary motivation for bringing the suit is of course a matter of
speculation. It is clear, however, that Douglas County—which bills itself “the Timber Capital
of the Nation”—had good reason to fear the economic consequences of the critical habitat
designation. At the time of the designation, about two-thirds of the county’s annual operating
budget was derived from federal timber sale receipts and much of its property tax base was tied
to the timber industry. Restrictions on timber harvesting in areas designated as critical habitat
for the spotted owl would no doubt heighten the economic hardship in a county that had already seen nine lumber mills close since 1990. For stories describing the impact of owl preservation on Douglas County and the timber industry generally, see Kim Murphy, Differing Values Cut Through Timber Debate, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1996, at A1; Tom Kenworthy, Timber
Plan Brings Little Peace to Oregonians, WASH. POST, July 4, 1993, at A8; Knickerbocker, supra
note 4, at 10; Jorge Casuso, Owl Decision Leaves Town in Anguish, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1990,
at C1.
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
18. Examples include construction projects with direct impacts on the environment, such
as bridges, highways, dams and reservoirs. NEPA cases involving these types of projects are
too legion to list here. For a discussion of such litigation and some case citations, see DANIEL
R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION §§10:29-10:32 (1984 & 1991 Supp.). NEPA
may also apply to agency actions with intangible or indirect impacts, and even to an agency’s
failure to act. See MANDELKER, supra, §§ 10:36-37, 8:23.
19. The commissioners of Catron County, New Mexico liked the argument so much that
they filed an identical suit challenging a designation of critical habitat in that county. See infra
note 21 and accompanying text. In Idaho, the commissioners of Lemhi County considered filing a NEPA claim to challenge measures taken by the National Marine Fisheries Service to
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dated by the courts, the argument could transform NEPA into a tool
for delaying or even defeating critical habitat designations and other
environmentally benevolent federal actions.
In December 1992, to the surprise and dismay of environmentalists, Douglas County won summary judgment and injunctive relief
preventing the Secretary of Interior from enforcing the critical habi20
tat designation for the northern spotted owl. Soon thereafter, the
Board of Commissioners of Catron County, New Mexico filed a
similar suit in federal district court, alleging that the FWS had unlawfully failed to comply with NEPA when it listed the spikedace (Meda
fulgida (Girard)) and loach minnow (Rhinichthys cobitis (Girard)) as
21
threatened species and established critical habitats for them. Environmentalists and administrators in the Interior Department collectively gasped when Catron County also won partial summary judg22
ment and injunctive relief.
The Secretary of Interior promptly appealed both decisions, with
mixed results. In regard to the designation of critical habitat for the
spotted owl, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court, and held that NEPA’s procedural requirements did not
23
apply to the designation of critical habitat. However, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, ruling
that the Service was obliged to comply with NEPA’s procedural requirements before designating critical habitat in New Mexico for the

protect endangered and threatened salmon species. See Candace Burns, Lemhi County
Squares Off With Agency Over Salmon, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Nov. 26, 1993, at B1. Farmers in California’s Central Valley also invoked NEPA to try to stop water transfers designed to
rehabilitate environmental and wildlife resources. See Westlands Water Dist. v. United States
Dep’t of Interior, 43 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Todd Woody, Industry Can’t Turn Tables
on Environmentalists, THE RECORDER, Feb. 27, 1995, at 1.
20. See Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992), rev’d sub. nom. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).
21. See Catron County Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, No.
CIV-93-730-HB, slip op. (D. N.M. Oct. 13, 1994), aff’d, 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996). The
county claimed that the critical habitat designation would prevent water diversion and impoundment, and thereby threaten flood damage to county property. Id. at 1433.
22. See Catron County Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 75 F.3d
1429 (10th Cir. 1996). Unlike their counterparts in Oregon, the commissioners of Catron
County were seemingly motivated more by political than economic concerns. Since 1989, when
it adopted a series of ordinances asserting control over local land-use decisions, Catron County
has been associated with the so-called “county movement,” whose proponents believe that federal environmental laws infringe upon local autonomy and unduly burden western agricultural
economies. See generally Mark Dowie, With Liberty and Firepower for All, 20 OUTSIDE 60
(Nov. 1995) .
23. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
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24

spikedace and loach minnow. The conflicting rulings of the Ninth
and Tenth circuits have confused an already unsettled question of
law—whether NEPA’s procedural requirements apply to federal actions expressly intended to protect or preserve natural resources.
This Note argues that NEPA should apply to such actions. It
begins, in Part I, with a brief overview of the National Environmental
Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act. Part II then analyzes
the applicability of NEPA to listing decisions and designations of
critical habitat under section 4 of the Endangered Species Act. This
Part begins with a detailed discussion of an important precedent from
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals before proceeding to the conflicting analyses set forth in the Douglas County and Catron County
cases. Finally, Part III argues that NEPA should apply not only to
designations of critical habitat, but to all federal actions which presumably “enhance” or “protect” the environment.
I. THE STATUTES AT ISSUE
To understand whether Congress intended NEPA to apply to
designations of critical habitat, and to evaluate the policy implications of exempting critical habitat designations from NEPA’s procedural requirements, it is necessary to briefly outline the relevant provisions and policies of each statute.
A. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
25

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was the first in
a series of major legislative initiatives which comprise existing federal
environmental law. However, unlike most of the environmental
statutes which followed it, NEPA does not establish detailed regulatory mechanisms to control the discharge of specific substances or to
26
reduce ambient pollution levels in specific media. Rather, NEPA
imposes a broad mandate on federal agencies to incorporate environmental considerations into their decision-making processes. It is
primarily a procedural, rather than a substantive, statute —that is, it
requires only a particular process, and does not mandate specific out-

24. Catron County Bd. of Comm’rs v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 75 F.3d 1429 (10th
Cir. 1996).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1994).
26. Cf. the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) (providing
regulatory mechanisms “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation’s waters”); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994) (providing regulatory mechanisms “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources”).
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27

comes or results. As the Supreme Court has stated, NEPA does not
require agencies “to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations,” it only requires agencies to “take a ‘hard
look’ at the environmental consequences before taking a major ac28
tion.”
1. NEPA’s Procedural Requirements. NEPA requires all federal
agencies to consider the environmental impact of “major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
29
environment.” When a federal agency proposes action which will
have a “significant” effect on the environment, the agency must
comply with NEPA by preparing a “detailed statement” describing
30
the proposed action’s probable impacts on the environment. The
31
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has promulgated
regulations which describe the process and parameters of preparing
32
such an environmental impact statement (EIS).
The first step in the process is to determine whether or not the
proposed action is “major” and will have a “significant” effect on the
environment. Sometimes an agency will determine that its proposed

27. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
28. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983). A corollary of this interpretation is that the courts may not review an agency’s substantive decision to proceed with a proposed action, even if that action will have significant environmental impacts. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (NEPA did not
contemplate “that a court should substitute its judgment for that of the agency” or “interject
itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken”).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
30. Specifically, NEPA requires the preparation of a detailed statement by the responsible
official on—
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. § 4332(C)(i)-(v).
31. The CEQ was created by NEPA to, inter alia, “develop and recommend … national
policies to foster and promote the improvement of environmental quality.” Id. § 4332(4).
CEQ was subsequently charged with “[i]ssuing regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of [NEPA’s] procedural provisions.” Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. § 124 (1978).
32. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-17 (1996). In addition, most federal agencies have issued regulations which clarify how it will comply with the CEQ requirements. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 6.100
- .1007 (governing the EPA’s implementation of NEPA); 33 C.F.R. §§ 230.1-230.26 (1996)
(governing NEPA implementation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).

352

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 8:345

action does not meet this threshold requirement, in which case
NEPA does not apply at all. When the environmental impacts of a
proposed action are uncertain, the agency may first prepare an Envi33
ronmental Assessment (EA). The purpose of the EA is to determine whether a full EIS is necessary. Upon completion of the EA,
the agency may make a “finding of no significant impact” and proceed with the proposed project. Alternatively, it may begin the
34
preparation of a full-blown EIS.
If and when an agency decides to prepare an EIS, it begins the
process by publishing a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register. The
agency must then invite representatives from affected local, state,
and federal agencies, Indian tribes, and other stakeholders to help
determine the scope of the study. Typically, the agency will publish a
draft EIS and accept and respond to public comments before publishing its final EIS. If the project is substantially modified after the
Final EIS has been completed, the agency may also have to prepare a
Supplemental EIS. To complete the process, the agency issues a
public Record of Decision (ROD), discussing alternatives to the proposed action, explaining why the proposed action was chosen, and
describing the means by which environmental harm will be avoided
35
or minimized.
The EIS process can be expensive and it obviously delays proposed federal actions. Typically the most significant delays result
from the time-consuming process of consultation, public comment,
and, in many cases, litigation. NEPA regulations require the lead
agency to consult with other federal and state agencies which have an
36
interest in the proposed project. The lead agency must also solicit
37
and respond to public comment at the earliest stages of the process.
Most importantly, the agency must develop a record which can be re38
viewed by the courts. The longest delays generally occur when litigants challenge the adequacy of the EIS in court.

33. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b), 1501.4(e), 1508.9, 1508.13 (1996).
34. Id. § 1508.9.
35. For a detailed description of the process of preparing an EIS, see generally JACOB I.
BREGMAN & KENNETH M. MACKENTHUN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS (1992).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1996).
37. Id. § 1501.7; see also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 836 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining
that “before a preliminary or threshold determination of significance is made the responsible
agency must give notice to the public of the proposed major federal action and an opportunity
to submit relevant facts which might bear upon the agency’s threshold decision”).
38. Although NEPA contains no provisions for enforcement or judicial review, the federal
courts have allowed interested parties to challenge the adequacy of an agency’s analysis under
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The delay associated with preparing an EIS may frustrate both
agency officials and the constituents who stand to benefit from proposed agency actions. However, in the eyes of Congress and the
courts, the costs of delaying federal action are presumably outweighed by the benefits of preparing an EIS. In resolving NEPA disputes, the federal courts have emphasized two primary benefits which
flow from the preparation of an EIS. First, preparation of the EIS
“inject[s] environmental considerations into the federal agency’s de39
cisionmaking process.” Additionally, the EIS “inform[s] the public
that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its deci40
sion-making process.” Congress considered these purposes so important that it explicitly declared that agencies are to comply with
41
NEPA “to the fullest extent possible.” The federal courts have
42
made it clear that this language is not hyperbole.
2. Exemptions from NEPA. Although Congress intended for
federal agencies to comply with NEPA “to the fullest extent
possible,” in certain circumstances agencies may be legally exempted
from NEPA’s procedural requirements. Occasionally Congress will
exempt specific federal actions from NEPA by clearly indicating its
intent to do so in a subsequently enacted statute. Congress has, for
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551-559. See, e.g., Hanley v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that agency determinations may properly be reviewed by federal courts to ensure they are not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law”).
39. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
40. Id. See also Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he
impact statement should provide the public with information on the environmental impacts of a
proposed project as well as encourage public participation in the development of that information.”); Iowa Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 1973) (one purpose of an EIS “is to promote a basis for critical evaluation by those not associated with the
agency”); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 891 (1st Cir. 1973) (agencies prepare impact statements
with “the goal of . . . informing the members of the community and the public what the environmental impact will be”); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Congress contemplated that the [EIS] would . . . [inform] the Congress as
well as the Executive . . . and would be available to enhance the enlightenment of—and by—
the public.”).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
42. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does
not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA’s procedural
requirements somehow ‘discretionary’.”); Westlands Water Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 43 F.3d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We give NEPA the broadest possible interpretation.”). NEPA presumptively applies even to those federal actions which advance the most
compelling governmental interests, such as national security. See Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d
445 (8th Cir. 1988) (NEPA applicable to development of the MX missile program).
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example, explicitly exempted the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) from the requirement of preparing an EIS for all actions the
agency takes pursuant to the Clean Air Act and most actions that it
43
Congress has also on
takes pursuant to the Clean Water Act.
occasion exempted specific federal projects or programs from
44
NEPA’s requirements.
Generally, the courts will not allow an agency to bypass NEPA
45
unless Congress has very clearly expressed its intention to exempt it.
However, the courts have recognized some implied exceptions to
NEPA. Perhaps the most widely recognized and widely applied category of implied exemption arises when NEPA conflicts with another
statutory mandate, making it impossible for the action agency to
comply with both statutes. The leading case describing the “statutory
conflict” exemption is Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers
46
Ass’n.
The issue in that case was whether the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was required to comply
with NEPA when performing its duties under the Interstate Land
47
Sales Disclosure Act. The Act required HUD to allow a statement
of record filed by a real estate developer to become effective within
thirty days of filing. The Supreme Court recognized that HUD could
not comply with the statute’s thirty day time constraint if it had to file
an environmental impact statement, and determined that where “a
clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA
48
must give way.”
43. A provision in the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act expressly exempts EPA from having to prepare an EIS when it acts pursuant to the Clean Air Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1994) (“No action taken under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed a major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning
of the National Environmental Policy Act.”). See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1994) (stating that environmental impact statements need not be prepared
for actions proposed pursuant to that statute except in connection with grants for the construction of publicly owned waste treatment plants and in connection with issuance of discharge
permits to new sources).
44. See, e.g., Earth Resources of Alaska v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 617 F.2d
775 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (applying congressional exemption for the Alaska pipeline system); San
Antonio Conserv. Soc’y v. Texas Highway Dep’t, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying congressional exemption for the San Antonio highway).
45. See, e.g., Chelsea Neighborhood Ass’n v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378 (2d
Cir. 1975) (holding that the Postal Service must comply with NEPA not withstanding a statute
providing that “no Federal law dealing with public or Federal contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds . . . shall apply to the exercise of the powers of the Postal
Service”).
46. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1994).
48. Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788. HUD also argued that it should be exempted from
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Other courts have since adhered to Flint Ridge and excused
agency compliance with NEPA when the agency was faced with immutable statutory time constraints or some other “clear and unavoid49
able” statutory conflict. However, the CEQ has interpreted the
50
Flint Ridge exemption narrowly, and the case law supports this
51
view. Some courts have extended Flint Ridge by suggesting that an
unavoidable statutory conflict arises when the action proposed by a
federal agency is nondiscretionary. These courts have taken the view
that when an agency is required to perform some statutory duty, consideration of environmental impacts is “irrelevant” because such con52
sideration cannot abrogate the agency’s statutory duty to act. Other
53
courts, however, have rejected this view.
NEPA’s requirements because it had no discretion under the Disclosure Act to consider environmental impacts. The Supreme Court did not reach this issue. Id.
49. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 512 F.2d 1332, 1346
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Amer. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 494 F.2d 925, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Dry Color Manufac. Ass’n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 108 (3rd Cir. 1973); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102, 1104-05 (D. D.C.), aff’d 502 F.2d 1154, 1156-57(Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals,1974). But see Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to find a “clear and unavoidable” conflict between NEPA and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act because Congress intended that the agencies and reviewing courts “make as
liberal interpretation as we can to accommodate the application of NEPA”); Forelaws on
Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1984) (compelling agency to comply with NEPA
because the time constraints faced by agency were not unavoidable, but rather, the result of an
“excessively narrow construction” of its statutory mandate).
50. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1996) (agencies shall comply with NEPA “except where compliance would be inconsistent with other statutory requirements.”).
51. These courts have prevented the exemption from swallowing the rule by skeptically
examining whether an alleged statutory conflict may fairly be characterized as “clear and unavoidable.” See, e.g., Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to find a
“clear and unavoidable” conflict between NEPA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act because Congress intended that the agencies and reviewing courts “make as liberal interpretation
as we can to accommodate the application of NEPA”); Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d
677, 684 (9th Cir. 1984) (compelling agency to comply with NEPA because the time constraints
faced by agency were not unavoidable but rather the result of an “excessively narrow construction” of its statutory mandate).
52. See, e.g., Milo Community Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144, 147-48 (1st Cir. 1975)
(preparation of EIS unnecessary because environmental considerations were “irrelevant” to
agency’s nondiscretionary decision to terminate hospital’s federally-assisted status); South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1980) (“it is at least doubtful that the Secretary’s
nondiscretionary approval of a mineral patent” is subject to NEPA); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Secretary not required to prepare an EIS when he has no discretion to deny coal lease and when he has “introduc[ed] environmental analysis at crucial points in the leasing process”); Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus,
657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981) (discussed in detail at infra notes 131-163 and accompanying text).
See also Westlands Water Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 43 F.3d 457, 460 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding NEPA inapplicable to water transfers under the Central Valley Project Improvement Act because “Congress did not give the Secretary discretion over when he may
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Another widely-recognized category of exemption applies when
an agency’s decision-making process duplicates or provides the
“functional equivalence” of NEPA’s procedural requirements. The
54
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus
provides the most complete analysis of the “functional equivalence”
exemption. The issue in Portland Cement was whether the EPA was
obligated to prepare an impact statement before adopting a New
55
Source Performance Standard pursuant to the Clean Air Act. The
D.C. Circuit determined that the provisions which authorized the
EPA to adopt such standards also required the agency to consider the
“counter-productive” environmental effects of its rule and to analyze
56
a wide array of “environmental considerations, pro and con.” Even
though the EPA’s rule-making process would not provide all the advantages of a “structured” NEPA analysis, the court concluded that
the process would “strike a workable balance between some of the
57
advantages and disadvantages of full application of NEPA.” In particular, the statutory procedures allowed other agencies to comment
on the proposed rules, thus providing “a channel for informed deci58
sion-making.” The proposed rule also provided notice “to the pub59
lic and the Congress.” Finally, the proposed rule would be subject
to judicial review, thereby ensuring that the agency would not arbitrarily “disregard . . . environmental factors.” On this basis, the court
60
held that EPA did not need to prepare a formal EIS. Other courts
came to similar conclusions when reviewing EPA actions under dif61
ferent provisions in the Clean Air Act. The courts have also excarry out [those] duties”). The issue of nondiscretionary duties was raised in Flint Ridge, but
the Supreme Court had no occasion to reach it. See supra note 48.
53. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619, 634 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[e]ven in
a case where the agency has no discretion,” the agency must comply with NEPA if it initiates or
“substantially assists” a program which will have a significant impact on the environment);
Scenic Rivers Ass’n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 245 (10th Cir. 1975) (NEPA requires agencies to
consider environmental problems “regardless of whether the agency has authority to do anything about [them]”), rev’d on other grounds sub. nom. Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic
Rivers Ass’n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
54. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55. The Clean Air Act directs the EPA Administrator to categorize all stationary sources
of air pollution and to promulgate “standards of performance” applicable to all new sources of
air pollution within those categories. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (1994).
56. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 386.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 387.
61. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Several federal
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tended the “functional equivalence” exemption to actions taken by
62
EPA pursuant to other statutes.
Despite the abundance of case law on functional equivalence,
the precise parameters of this exemption remain ambiguous. Some
courts have suggested that the functional equivalence exemption applies broadly to any action proposed by the EPA. In one early case,
for example, the D.C. Circuit opined, “we see little need in requiring
a NEPA statement from an agency whose raison d’être is the protec63
tion of the environment.” Such broad language suggests that the
functional equivalence exemption could be applied not only to the
EPA, but to any agency which is perceived as a guardian of the envi64
ronment or a steward of the nation’s natural resources. However,
the D.C. Circuit quickly emphasized that it was “not formulating a
broad exemption from NEPA for all environmental agencies or even
for all environmentally protective regulatory actions of such agen65
An agency would only be exempted from NEPA when
cies.”
“substantive and procedural standards ensure full and adequate conCourts of Appeal had actually ruled that the EPA was exempt from NEPA prior to Portland
Cement. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 1973);
Buckeye Power v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 174 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481
F.2d 1, 9 (3d Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 n.130 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 508 (4th Cir. 1973); Getty Oil v.
Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1972). Congress later exempted EPA actions pursuant
to the Clean Air Act. See supra note 43.
62. See, e.g., State of Alabama ex. rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1990)
(applying the functional equivalence doctrine to EPA’s procedure for permitting hazardous
waste landfills under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Wyoming v. Hathaway,
525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975) (EPA need not comply with NEPA before suspending registrations
for three toxins pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (EPA need not comply with
NEPA before suspending registrations for three toxins pursuant to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.C. 1981)
(EPA need not comply with NEPA before approving a landfill site for PCBs under the Toxic
Substances Control Act).
63. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 n.130 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
accord Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 71-72 (10th Cir. 1975) (“[A]n organization like
EPA whose regulatory activities are necessarily concerned with environmental consequences
need not stop in the middle of its proceedings in order to issue a separate and distinct impact
statement just to be issuing it.”).
64. Interestingly, despite the judicial consensus that the EPA need not prepare an EIS
when acting to protect the environment, Congress nevertheless urged the EPA to prepare impact statements. H.R. REP. NO. 93-520, 18-19 (1973). The Agency agreed that “preparation of
environmental statements will have beneficial effects for certain of its major regulatory actions.” EPA Statement of Policy and Procedures for Preparation of Environmental Impact
Statements, 39 Fed. Reg. 16,186 (May 7, 1974).
65. Envtl. Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis added)
(holding that the EPA need not comply with NEPA when acting pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
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66

sideration of environmental issues.” The court excused the EPA
from complying with NEPA when it canceled registrations for the use
of DDT, but only after finding that the agency’s rule-making procedures provided the “functional equivalent of a NEPA investigation
67
… for all of the five core NEPA issues.” Other courts have substan68
tially agreed with this position. The majority approach constructs
“functional equivalence” as a “narrow exemption” which applies only
when “the purposes and policies behind NEPA will necessarily be
69
fulfilled” by otherwise required agency procedures.
A third type of exemption, recognized by the Ninth Circuit, is
70
sometimes categorized as a “functional equivalence” exemption,
even though its analytical foundations are diametrically opposed to
the reasoning set forth in Portland Cement and its progeny. The ex71
ception created in Merrell v. Thomas is better described as a
“displacement” exemption. In Merrell, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the EPA was obliged to prepare NEPA documents before
registering seven herbicides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
72
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The court articulated two independent grounds for holding that NEPA did not apply to the EPA’s
registration decision. First, the statutory time constraint exemption
73
set forth in Flint Ridge provided a well-recognized ground for the
court’s holding. FIFRA requires the EPA to act “as expeditiously as
possible,” and the court recognized that this “time frame is incom-

66. Id. at 1257.
67. Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). The court listed these five issues as: “the environmental
impact of the action, possible adverse environmental effects, possible alternatives, the relationship between long- and short-term uses and goals, and any irretrievable commitments of resources.” Id.
68. See, e.g., Jones v. Gordon, 621 F. Supp. 7, 13 (D. Alaska 1985) (“[t]he mere fact an
agency has been given the role of implementing an environmental statute is insufficient to invoke the ‘functional equivalent’ exception”), aff’d on other grounds, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1986) (affirmed in part, reversed in part).
69. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d at 1257. Accord Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 71-72 (10th Cir. 1975) (EPA need not prepare an EIS before canceling or
suspending registrations of three coyote poisons).
70. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 18, at 66 (listing Merrell v. Thomas, discussed infra,
under the heading “Functional Equivalence”).
71. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
72. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (1994). Unlike the agency proposal in Portland Cement, the
registration of herbicides was not environmentally “benevolent.” Plaintiff was joined by the
Natural Resources Defense Council, whereas EPA as defendant was joined by five large
chemical companies and the National Agricultural Chemicals Association. See 807 F.2d at 776.
73. Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976). For a detailed discussion of this case, see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
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patible with the lengthy research and hearings that are ordinarily part
74
of preparing an EIS.”
However, the bulk of the court’s decision in Merrell deals with a
second, novel ground for its holding–-that “[t]he differences between
FIFRA’s registration procedure and NEPA’s requirements indicate
75
that Congress did not intend that NEPA apply.” The court ac76
knowledged that FIFRA was similar in some ways to NEPA, but
felt that the statutes’ differences were more relevant in determining
Congressional intent. The court first recognized that FIFRA’s limited provision for public notice “obviously falls short of an EIS requirement, both because [EPA] will not have to publish the notice
with respect to many applications, and because the notice does not
77
contain the information contained in an EIS.” It then noted that
FIFRA restricts the types of information which the EPA may make
available to the public and pointed out that “NEPA does not contain
78
equivalent restrictions.” In other words, FIFRA plainly “designed a
registration procedure with public notice and public participation
provisions that materially differ from those that NEPA would re79
quire.”
Clearly, the Ninth Circuit did not consider NEPA and FIFRA to
be equivalent. In contrast to the functional equivalence exemption,
the exemption in Merrell was constructed around the substantive differences—rather than the substantive similarities—between NEPA’s
procedural requirements and FIFRA’s statutory requirements. The
court considered FIFRA to be a wholly new set of procedures for
dealing with all aspects of pesticide registrations, including the environmental impacts of such registrations. In the court’s view, these
procedures effectively displaced NEPA. Noting that these new registration procedures represented “a compromise between environmen80
talists, farmers, and manufacturers,” the court concluded that it

74. See 807 F.2d at 778. But Cf. Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1986)
(requirement that agency publish notice “as soon as practicable” after application is deemed
sufficient does not excuse agency from complying with NEPA).
75. See Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 778 (noting that the registration procedure in FIFRA was designed “to ensure consideration of [the] environmental impact[s]” of herbicide spraying).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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would be inappropriate to “sabotage the delicate machinery that
81
Congress designed to register new pesticides.”
Although now firmly entrenched in the case law, the exemptions
set forth in Flint Ridge, Portland Cement, and Merrell have by no
means swallowed the directive that agencies must comply with NEPA
“to the fullest extent possible.” The “displacement” exemption set
forth in Merrell has not been widely adopted in other circuits, nor has
82
it been applied often by the Ninth Circuit. Although widely recognized, the functional equivalence exemption has been limited to the
EPA. The statutory conflict exemption first recognized in Flint Ridge
83
has also been applied sparingly. A federal agency proposing an action with significant environmental impacts therefore risks expensive
and time-consuming litigation if it chooses to ignore NEPA’s procedural mandates.
B. The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
84

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 has been called “the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species
85
ever enacted by any nation.” Like NEPA, the ESA has very ambitious goals; yet unlike NEPA, it is not a very long or complicated
86
statute.
1. The Listing Process and Protections for Listed Species. The
listing process has been referred to as the “keystone of the
87
Endangered Species Act,” because only species which have been
88
Section 4 of the ESA
listed receive protection under the Act.
81. Id. at 779.
82. The displacement exemption was most notably dusted off and applied in Douglas
County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995). See infra notes 170-184 and accompanying
text.
83. See supra note 51.
84. Codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
85. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
86. The provisions of the Endangered Species Act which govern federal actions are directed at “the Secretary” of the Interior and Commerce Departments. In practice, the Secretaries delegate their statutory responsibilities to the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), respectively. The FWS maintains jurisdiction over terrestrial wildlife and
freshwater fish, while the NMFS deals with threatened and endangered marine organisms, including marine mammals. For convenience, this Note will refer to the implementing agency as
“the Secretary,” “the FWS” or “the Service.”
87. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, 2d Sess., at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807,
2810.
88. The Secretary is not authorized to intervene on behalf of any species which has not
been listed, even if that species is in imminent danger of extinction. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block,
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89

90

stipulates that species are to be listed as endangered or threatened
“solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
91
available.” Species may be proposed for listing by the Secretary or
92
by any interested person who submits a petition to the Secretary. In
1982, Congress made listing a mandatory duty and incorporated tight
deadlines into the listing process. Currently, the Secretary has 90
days to determine whether petitions to list or delist a species present
“substantial . . . information indicating that the potential action may
93
be warranted.” For a petition which passes this threshold inquiry,
the Secretary must complete a status review for the proposed species
and find that the listing is warranted, not warranted, or “warranted
94
but precluded” by other pending listing proposals. When listing is
warranted, the Secretary must publish a proposed regulation in the
Federal Register and adopt or withdraw a final regulation within one
95
year.
Once a species has been listed as endangered or threatened, it
falls under the Act’s protective umbrella. The substance of this legal
protection is primarily defined in Sections 7 and 9 of the ESA. Sec96
tion 9 makes it unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States to commercially exploit or “take” individual mem97
bers of any species which has been listed as endangered. The Act
defines “take” broadly in order to prohibit almost any activity which
708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (refusing to enjoin construction of a ski resort which would allegedly eradicate an alpine plant because the plant was not listed under Section 4); Fund for Animals v. Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 550 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(refusing to enjoin a state sponsored deer hunt because the white-tailed deer was not listed and
did not breed with any listed deer species).
89. An endangered species is any species, other than certain species of insects, “which is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)
(1994).
90. A threatened species is “any species which is likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id. §
1532(20).
91. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
92. See id. §§ 1533(a)(1), 1533(b)(3).
93. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A). This duty must be carried out “to the maximum extent practicable.” Id.
94. Id. §§ 1533(b)(3)(B)(i)-(iii). A decision that listing is not warranted or warranted but
precluded can be challenged in court. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii).
95. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(A). The Secretary may delay final action for another six months if
there is substantial disagreement about the sufficiency or accuracy of the data upon which the
listing decision is to be made.
96. The ESA defines “person” broadly to include individuals, business organizations, and
government employees and instrumentalities. See id. § 1532(13) (1994).
97. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
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98

would hinder the recovery of an endangered species. Unauthorized
99
takings give rise to both civil and criminal liability.
Federal and state agencies are considered “persons” subject to
100
Therefore, these agencies must enthe prohibitions in Section 9.
sure that no endangered species will be “taken” by actions which they
initiate, fund, permit, or otherwise endorse. Section 9 is especially
relevant to agencies which manage public lands because the courts
have recognized that destruction or degradation of critical habitat
101
may constitute an illegal taking under Section 9. In practice, however, the importance of Section 9 has been eclipsed by the consultation provisions in Section 7 which are directed explicitly at federal
agencies.
Section 7 directs that “[e]ach federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica102
tion of [critical] habitat of such species.” The procedure for Section
7 consultations has been outlined in detail in joint regulations promulgated by the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service
103
Most Section 7 consultations involve only informal
(“NMFS”).

98. “The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” Id. § 1532(19). Actions which modify
or degrade the habitat of a listed species may constitute an illegal taking. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(defining “harm” to include habitat modifications that kill or injure wildlife); see also Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding
the Secretary’s regulation).
99. Penalties and enforcement provisions are set forth in section 11 of the ESA (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1540). The ESA allows the Secretary to permit takings which are “incidental to .
. . the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). However, permission for incidental takings may only be granted if the applicant has prepared a conservation
plan which describes the activity’s impact on the affected species and the steps the applicant
will implement to minimize and mitigate those impacts. See id. § 1539(2)(A)(i) - (ii).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85
(1978).
101. See, e.g., Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 687; Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila II); Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land and Natural
Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Palila I”)
(holding that Section 9 made it unlawful for the State of Hawaii to graze sheep and goats in the
critical habitat of an endangered bird); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988)
(holding that the U.S. Forest Service committed a taking under Section 9 when it allowed clearcutting of old-growth pine trees in close proximity to colonies of endangered woodpeckers),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
103. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.10-402.15 (1996).
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communications between FWS and the action agency to determine
whether listed species are in the project area and whether the project
104
is likely to adversely affect such species or their critical habitat. If it
appears that the proposed action may affect a listed species or its
critical habitat, then the agency must begin a more formal consultation process, the culmination of which is the issuance of a “biological
opinion” finding that the proposed action is either likely to jeopardize a listed species or degrade its critical habitat, or presents no jeop105
If it receives a “no jeopardy” opinion, the action agency is
ardy.
106
The consegenerally free to proceed with its proposed action.
quence of a “jeopardy” opinion is more uncertain. Although the Supreme Court has stated that the ESA’s admonition to ensure that
listed species are not jeopardized is an “affirmative command” that
107
“admits of no exception,” several subsequent court decisions suggest that the action agency is free to proceed with its proposed action,
as long as it has actually gone through the consultation process and
108
has some reasonable basis for disputing the Service’s final opinion.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that the FWS cannot “order
other agencies to comply with its requests or . . . veto their deci109
The Supreme Court has also backed away from its early
sions.”
104. Regulations for “informal consultation” are set forth at 50 C.F.R. § 402.13 (1996).
Approximately 90 percent of all consultations are concluded informally. See U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING
ACTIONS (1992).
105. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)-(h) (1996).
106. Although the action agency “may not rely solely upon . . . a biological opinion to establish conclusively its compliance with its substantive obligations under section 7(a)(2),” the
courts will only inquire whether the agency’s reliance on a biological opinion was “arbitrary or
capricious.” Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415
(9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to enjoin a federal lease of water rights which might imperil an endangered fish because the Service had determined that the proposed reallocation of water would
not jeopardize the existence of the species). In addition, if the Service issues a “no jeopardy”
opinion, the action agency cannot be held liable for a taking under Section 9. Id.
107. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).
108. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303 (8th Cir. 1976) (“Consultation
under Section 7 does not require acquiescence. Should a difference of opinion arise as to a
given project, the responsibility for decision after consultation is not vested in the Secretary but
in the agency involved.”); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976)
(“[Once] an agency has had meaningful consultation with the Secretary . . . the final decision of
whether or not to proceed with the action lies with the agency itself.”); Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that an action agency may proceed even where it’s evidence that there is no likelihood of jeopardy is
“admittedly weak”). But see Roosevelt Campobello Internat’l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041,
1055 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that an action agency which receives a jeopardy opinion cannot
proceed unless it has completed all “practicable” scientific studies).
109. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1386 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Tribal Village of
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dictum suggesting that agencies must comply with a biological opin110
ion.
2. Critical Habitat Designations. Once a species has been listed
as endangered or threatened, the FWS has the obligation to designate
“critical habitat” for that species. Critical habitat is defined by the
statute as “the specific areas within the geographical area occupied
by the species . . . on which are found those biological features (i)
essential to the conservation of the species and (ii) which may require
special management considerations or protection,” as well as
“specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species
111
. . . [if] such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.”
Unlike the listing decision, the designation of critical habitat is not
based exclusively on scientific data. The FWS must consider “the
economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any
112
particular area as critical habitat.” The FWS has the discretion to
“exclude any area from critical habitat if . . . the benefits of such
exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as critical
113
Barring unusual circumstances, listings and critical
habitat.”
114
habitat designations are required to occur “concurrently.”
Critical habitat has been perhaps the most controversial aspect
115
of the ESA. The language of the ESA prohibits actions that modify
Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the FWS cannot compel an action
agency to implement conservation recommendations attached to its biological opinion).
110. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568 (1992) (noting that whether
funding agencies are bound by the consultation process “is very much an open question”).
111. Id. § 1532(5)(A). Joint regulations promulgated by the Interior and Commerce Departments provide examples of physical and biological features which may be considered essential to the conservation of a species, such areas important for population growth, food and water resources, shelter, breeding and rearing sites, and habitats that are representative of the
historic distribution of the species. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(1)-(5) (1996).
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
113. Id. Such discretion is removed if the best scientific and commercial data available suggests that “the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the
species concerned.” Id.
114. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C). In practice, however, critical habitat has rarely been designated at
the time of listing. Critical habitat was designated for less than 20 percent of the species listed
as threatened or endangered between 1973 and 1990. See MICHAEL BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3 (World Wildlife Fund: Washington 1991). Currently the ESA requires only that critical habitat designations be made “to the
maximum extent prudent and determinable.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). The statute explicitly
provides that designations of critical habitat can be delayed for up to two years after listing “[if]
the Secretary deems that (i) it is essential to the conservation of such species that the regulation
implementing such [listing] determination be promptly published; or (ii) critical habitat of such
species is not then determinable.” Id. §§ 1533(b)(6)(C)(i)-(ii).
115. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
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116

or destroy a species’ critical habitat. However, commentators appear to agree that the Department of Interior has promulgated regulations which effectively “took the prohibition on destruction or
modification of critical habitat and defined it in a way that removed it
117
. . . from the Act.” Under current regulations, “destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat is recognized only when such
alteration “appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for
118
As Professor
both the survival and recovery of a listed species.”
Houck has noted, “[t]his definition is exactly the same as that provided for ‘jeopardy’ to the species itself . . . With this sleight of hand,
Interior has equated the modification of critical habitat with jeop119
ardy. No separate protection is provided for critical habitat.”
Even though a designation of critical habitat does not appear to
provide a listed species with any legal protection above and beyond
that provided by the section 7 consultation process, some commentators nevertheless believe that “where designated, critical habitat ac120
complishes a great deal.” Professor Houck, for example, has noted
that courts rarely, if ever, approve federal intrusions into designated
121
critical habitat. At the same time, he argues, courts have been reluctant to enjoin federal actions when critical habitat has not been
122
designated. In Houck’s view, “the ESA’s prohibition on modificaU.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 COLO. L. REV. 277, 297 (1993) (noting that
“[t]he concept of protecting critical habitat has turned out to be an agony of the ESA”).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
117. Houck, supra note 115, at 299. Professor Houck, for instance, has argued:
Interior has undertaken to define critical habitat in a way that greatly minimizes its
importance. It has moreover, for the great majority of species, simply refused to designate critical habitat at all. The effect of these actions is to eliminate the most objective and powerful requirement of the statute--that critical habitat not be modified-and allow Interior to administer the Act on the more uncertain and discretionary terrain of jeopardy.
Id. at 297. See also Katherine Simmons Yagerman, Protecting Critical Habitat Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 811, 827-45 (1990) (describing the fusion of critical
habitat with jeopardy); James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look From a Litigator’s Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 507 n.29 (1991) (tying
the prohibition on destroying or modifying critical habitat to “the concomitant consultation
requirement”).
118. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(d) (1996).
119. Houck, supra note 115, at 299. Accord Yagerman, supra note 117, at 828 (noting that
despite the ESA’s “clear creation of a habitat protection mechanism … habitat protection is
[arguably] no longer a part of the statutory scheme”); Kilbourne, supra note 117, at 541
(“under this definition, a substantial amount of habitat modification could occur” without violating the Act).
120. Houck, supra note 115, at 308.
121. Id. at 308-09 (discussing cases decided by the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and the federal district court for the district of Nebraska).
122. Id. at 309-10.
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tion of critical habitat is interpreted by courts as strong and unyielding [whereas] the prohibition on jeopardy is viewed as discretionary
123
and flexible.”
The Interior Department might argue that such a designation—
by itself—does not restrict any particular land use or management activity and therefore does not constitute a “major Federal action” for
124
purposes of NEPA. While not inherently indefensible, such a position does conflict curiously with Interior regulations which implicitly
recognize that a critical habitat designation may impact (or prohibit)
125
Indeed, the
proposed or ongoing activities in designated areas.
FWS could not possibly comply with its statutory duty of considering
126
the “economic impact” of a critical habitat designation unless that
designation had some practical, foreseeable effect on commercial
127
land uses.
II. RECONCILING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT WITH NEPA
Because NEPA imposes procedural requirements on federal
agencies whenever such agencies propose action “significantly af128
fecting the quality of the human environment,” NEPA clearly has
much broader application than the ESA. However, in the context of
agency actions which may imperil threatened and endangered species, the two statutes overlap substantially. Both statutes impose
procedural requirements which, in theory, affect the decisions that
federal agencies make regarding threatened or endangered species
and their critical habitat. In addition, both statutes may be invoked
to delay or prevent proposed agency actions which would have a det129
rimental effect on such species or habitat.

123. Id. at 310.
124. Whether a critical habitat designation itself restricts particular land uses or merely
foreshadows such restrictions is relevant to the issue of NEPA’s applicability. See Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 404 (1976) (holding that “the mere ‘contemplation’ of certain action
is not sufficient to require an impact statement”).
125. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (1996) (requiring the Secretary to “consider the probable
economic and other impacts of the designation upon proposed or ongoing activities”) (emphasis
added).
126. See supra notes 8, 15 and accompanying text.
127. Recall that the FWS determined that the critical habitat designation for the northern
spotted owl would cost some $68 million in timber harvesting restrictions. See supra note 15.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
129. For example, both NEPA and the ESA were invoked by environmentalists to challenge federal actions which would have an impact on the spotted owl and its habitat. The National Forest Management Act provided a third cause of action. For a discussion of this litigation, see Jeb Boyt, Struggling to Protect Ecosystems and Biodiversity Under NEPA and NFMA:
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Although it is clear that NEPA and the ESA apply independently to federal actions which might affect listed species or their critical habitat, Congress has never stated how it intended the two statutes to relate to each other. The ESA was in existence for nine years
before any court was asked to decide whether NEPA applies to the
130
FWS when it proposes action pursuant to the ESA. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the first court to make a definitive
statement on this issue.
A. NEPA’s Application to Listing Decisions: Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Andrus
131

In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit considered whether NEPA required the FWS to
prepare an EIS before listing seven species of mollusks as endangered, or whether decisions to list species under Section 4 of the ESA
132
The court
were exempt from NEPA’s procedural requirements.
began its analysis by noting that NEPA was intended to apply
broadly, and that it could excuse the FWS from NEPA’s requirements only if it found “a statutory conflict . . . that expressly prohibits
133
or makes full compliance impossible.” There was, of course, no express statutory exemption in the Endangered Species Act. Nor, in
the court’s opinion, was there any statutory conflict “due to time con134
straints and the necessity of acting expeditiously.” The court also
found the functional equivalence doctrine inapplicable. Citing to
Portland Cement and its progeny, the court acknowledged that federal actions may be appropriately exempted from NEPA when the
statute being implemented by the action agency “serves the purposes

The Ancient Forests of the Pacific Northwest and the Northern Spotted Owl, 10 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 1009, 1024-39 (1993).
130. For many years, the Service proceeded as if NEPA’s procedural requirements did in
fact apply to these actions. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
131. 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
132. Id. at 831. Six mussel species were listed as endangered in 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,062
(June 14, 1976), and the seventh species was listed in 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,351 (Aug. 23, 1977).
These listings were not challenged until the FWS stated that completion of the Columbia Dam
on Tennessee’s Duck River would jeopardize the existence of two of the mussel species. At
that time, the Pacific Legal Foundation and several residents of Tennessee filed suit to force
the FWS to remove the mussels from the endangered species list, to prevent the FWS from enforcing the ESA, and to prevent the FWS from listing any other species found in the Duck
River until it had complied with NEPA. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 831.
133. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 833.
134. Id. at 834. For a discussion of cases in which NEPA was held to be inapplicable because of time constraints, see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
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of NEPA.” The court noted that, like NEPA, section 4 of the ESA
“provides for notice of proposed rulemaking . . . and provides oppor136
tunity for public comment.” However, it concluded that the listing
provisions in section 4 do not completely overlap NEPA’s procedural
requirements. Most importantly, the court noted that “at the time
the seven mussels were listed, the [ESA] did not provide for consideration of environmental, economic, or other consequences of the
137
Because an agency must consider environmental conselisting.”
quences when preparing an EIS, it was clear that in this case the listing process did not completely “serve the purposes” of NEPA. Accordingly, the court found that the functional equivalence exception
138
inapplicable to the FWS’s listing decision.
After rejecting the functional equivalence exemption, the court
nevertheless determined that NEPA’s procedural requirements impliedly conflict with the substantive mandate of the ESA. The court
identified three alternative bases for this conflict. First, it found that
“filing an impact statement does not and cannot serve the purposes of
139
the Endangered Species Act.” Second, it found that “filing an impact statement in the present case would not serve the purposes for
140
filing such a statement.” Third, it found that “listing species as endangered or threatened furthers the purposes of NEPA even though
141
no impact statement is filed.” Based on these three types of implied
statutory conflict, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the FWS has no
duty to prepare an EIS before listing a species as endangered or
142
threatened.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pacific Legal Foundation has
strongly influenced other courts which have subsequently examined
143
the relationship between NEPA and the ESA. It also prompted the
Department of Interior to stop complying with NEPA when it made
listing determinations and critical habitat designations under section
4 of the ESA. Before Pacific Legal Foundation, the FWS often prepared NEPA documentation before taking such actions. However, in
1983, the Department of Interior abruptly changed its policy, and jus135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id.
See Id.
Id.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 841.
See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
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144

tified its action in part by citing Pacific Legal Foundation. Because
Pacific Legal Foundation has been so influential both judicially and
administratively, its reasoning warrants careful scrutiny.
The first stated basis for the Sixth Circuit’s holding was that
“filing an impact statement does not and cannot serve the purposes of
145
the Endangered Species Act.” The court correctly noted that the
purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
146
However, the court did not then explain why an
be conserved.”
EIS would not or could not contribute to the goals of species and
habitat conservation. Because the ESA states that listing decisions
must be based exclusively on the species viability, it was reasonable
for the Sixth Circuit to conclude that an examination of extraneous
environmental factors would not influence the FWS’s decision147
making process. But the fact that the FWS must base its listing decisions on a limited set of considerations does not, by itself, mean that
the preparation of an EIS does not and cannot serve the purposes of
the ESA. It has been firmly established that the preparation of an
EIS serves two distinct functions—ensuring that an agency considers
environmental impacts in its internal decision-making processes, and
informing the public and other units of government about proposed
148
federal actions which will have significant environmental impacts.
The court did not bother to inquire if an EIS would advance the
ESA’s goal of species conservation by educating the public and state
and local governments about the FWS’s decision to list the mussels.
It essentially overlooked the fact that the preparation of an EIS provides an opportunity for agencies to publicly legitimize a proposed
action, and that such efforts may be crucial to the successful implementation of a conservation proposal.
The second basis for the Sixth Circuit’s holding was that “filing
an impact statement . . . would not serve the purposes for filing such a
149
statement.” One of the purposes of preparing an EIS is to inform
144. See 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (Oct. 25, 1983). Interior also cited a letter from the Council on
Environmental Quality urging the Service to cease preparing NEPA documents in conjunction
with actions under section 4 of the ESA. Id.
145. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 835.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 835 (the FWS “is required to list [species] … based on the five factors provided in the ESA. [It] does not have the discretion to consider the five factors required to be
considered in filing an impact statement”).
148. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
149. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 836.
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an agency’s decision-making process. The Sixth Circuit correctly
noted that “[t]he statutory mandate of ESA prevents the Secretary
from considering the environmental impact when listing a species as
150
endangered or threatened.” The court reasoned that if the EIS is
intended to “insure the agency . . . considered environmental factors,” when making its decisions, then the impact statement must be
superfluous “where the agency has no authority to consider environ151
mental factors.” The court essentially took the position that NEPA
does not apply to nondiscretionary agency actions, a question which
152
had been left open by the Supreme Court’s decision in Flint Ridge.
But the court’s reasoning on this point assumes that the one and only
purpose of an EIS is to inform agency decision-making; the court
again overlooked the fact that the information in an EIS may be of
153
interest to non-federal entities. If preparation of an impact statement would help landowners, businesses, and state and local governments understand the rationale for and the foreseeable consequences
of the listing decision, then the preparation of an EIS before a listing
could indeed “serve the purposes for filing such a statement.”
The third and perhaps most objectionable basis for the Sixth
Circuit’s holding was that “the Secretary’s action in listing species . . .
furthers the purposes of NEPA even though no impact statement is
154
filed.” The court described NEPA’s purposes broadly: “to promote
prevention or elimination of damage to the environment . . . ; [and] to
enrich the understanding of ecological systems and natural re155
sources.” It then reasoned that the decision to list a species must
necessarily advance NEPA’s goal of preventing environmental damage because the agency making that decision “is charged solely with
156
protecting the environment.” The court’s reasoning is again defec-

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
153. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 838 (stating that although some courts have recognized that NEPA serves an informational purpose, “this purpose does not exist independent of
the primary purpose to insure an informed decision by the [action] agency”).
154. Id. at 837.
155. Id.
156. Id. This language apparently represents the Courts’ interpretation on the FWS’ mandate as articulated by the Endangered Species Act and other statutes. It is not clear that this
interpretation is correct. The FWS clearly has a statutory duty to consider economic impacts
when designating critical habitat. The Supreme Court has likewise ruled that economic interests fall within the “zone of interests” which the ESA was designed to protect. See Bennett v.
Spears, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1996) (allowing ranchers and irrigation districts to challenge a jeopardy
opinion under the ESA’s citizen suit provision).
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tive in several respects. First, the court presumes that FWS will infallibly protect the environment merely because it is charged to do so.
Such a presumption fails to recognize that actions intended to preserve a single species—one constituent element in a larger ecosystem—may have detrimental impacts upon other constituent elements
157
of that ecosystem or upon the ecosystem as a whole. It also fails to
recognize that regulatory agencies may bow under the pressure of the
regulated community and propose actions which are not truly within
158
their statutory mandate. A second flaw in the court’s reasoning is
that it fails to explain how a listing decision furthers the second of
NEPA’s purposes—“enrich[ing] the understanding” of ecosystems.
As the court itself emphasized earlier in its opinion, the FWS does
159
not look at ecosystems when it is making a listing decision; rather,
the FWS is required to make listing decisions solely on the basis of
scientific data related to the population size and viability of the species under consideration. In fact, as the court recognized, the FWS is
expressly prohibited from including ecosystem considerations in its
160
listing decision. If that is indeed the case, then there is a real danger that, absent an EIS, larger ecosystem concerns will be overlooked, and an important goal of NEPA will go unserved.
Pacific Legal Foundation could have been decided on the narrow
ground that nondiscretionary actions are not subject to NEPA, a
principle which is not glaringly unreasonable and which had been
161
Instead, the Sixth Circuit carved out
recognized in other circuits.
an unprecedented, broad and poorly reasoned exception to NEPA
for agencies charged with protecting the environment, and in so doing, it ventured into a legal and logical morass which most other
courts had wisely avoided. To the extent that the Sixth Circuit too
hastily dismissed the informational value of the EIS, and applied different standards to environmentally “beneficial” actions without explaining how to distinguish a “beneficial” action from a harmful action, it undercut the persuasiveness of its own decision.

157. See infra Part III.C.
158. See id.
159. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 835.
160. See id. Listing decisions must be made on the narrow scientific ground of species vitality. See supra note 87-92 and accompanying text
161. See South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that nondiscretionary actions are not subject to NEPA); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (NEPA not applicable when Secretary has no discretion as to coal leases).
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B. NEPA’s Application to Designations of Critical Habitat
Shortly after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, the Department of Interior declared that it would
not prepare NEPA documentation when designating critical habitat
162
Although the Interior relied on Pacific Legal
for listed species.
163
Foundation in declaring this new policy, its reliance was misplaced.
Properly construed, the Sixth Circuit’s holding only provided authority on the issue of species listings. The Sixth Circuit had not directly
164
addressed designations of critical habitat, which are governed by a
165
different set of statutory criteria.
The question of NEPA’s applicability to designations of critical
habitat was not squarely presented to a federal court until 1992, when
the commissioners of Douglas County, Oregon sued the Fish and
Wildlife Service for failing to comply with NEPA before designating
critical habitat for the northern spotted owl. In Douglas County v.
166
Lujan, the government defended its failure to prepare an EIS for
the northern spotted owl critical habitat designation by arguing that
the action was analogous to a listing decision and should, therefore,
be covered under the same exemption set forth in Pacific Legal
Foundation. The district court accepted the government’s framing of
the issue, and proceeded to inquire “whether the reasoning in Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Andrus regarding listing decisions can be ex167
tended and applied to decisions to designate critical habitat.” The
168
court concluded it could not. The government promptly appealed

162. See supra notes 145 and accompanying text.
163. See id.
164. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit speculated upon NEPA’s application to designations of
critical habitat in dicta, and suggested that such designations might be exempt from NEPA under the doctrine of functional equivalence. See Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 835 (“the
ESA may now provide the functional equivalent of an impact statement when a critical habitat
is designated . . . [even though it] did not provide a functional equivalent of an impact statement with respect to listing a species at the time the seven mussels involved here were listed.”).
Surprisingly, this argument has not been expressly considered by any subsequent court. See
Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1504 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to address the functional equivalence
argument because it was not advanced by the litigants).
165. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
166. 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992), rev’d sub nom., Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d
1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).
167. Id. at 1478.
168. Id. at 1483 (“The reasoning in [Pacific Legal Found.] does not lead to the conclusion
that FWS is exempt from NEPA requirements when designating critical habitat [because] . . .
listing decisions . . . are statutorily distinguishable from the critical habitat designation process.”).
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the district court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit, which heard the case
under the name Douglas County v. Babbitt.
1. Douglas County v. Babbitt. In deciding whether NEPA
applies to critical habitat designations, the Ninth Circuit constructed
a three-part analysis which incorporated, but also added to, the threepart analysis in Pacific Legal Foundation. The court first declared
that the procedures for designating critical habitat had “displaced”
169
Second, it declared that an EIS is not
NEPA requirements.
required for proposed federal actions “that do nothing to alter the
170
Third, echoing the Sixth Circuit,
natural physical environment.”
the court found that the “ESA furthers the goals of NEPA without
171
demanding an EIS.”
The “displacement” rationale had antecedents in the Ninth Cir172
cuit’s 1986 decision Merrell v. Thomas. The Ninth Circuit first recognized some similarities between NEPA and the designation procedures set forth in §4 of the ESA. The court noted that the ESA’s
critical habitat provisions provide for public notice and incorporate a
173
“carefully crafted congressional mandate for public participation.”
They also require the FWS to consider the “best scientific data available,” including data on the type of environmental “impacts that con174
As in Merrell, however, the Ninth Circuit emphacern NEPA.”
sized the differences between NEPA procedures and the rulemaking
175
procedures set forth in the agency’s authorizing statute. The Ninth
Circuit noted that the ESA’s critical habitat provisions were not designed haphazardly, but rather represent a carefully tailored
176
“compromise between disparate points of view” that rendered
177
In essence, the court’s refusal to apply
NEPA “superfluous.”
NEPA stemmed from its reluctance to “sabotage the delicate ma-

169. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).
170. Id. at 1505.
171. Id. at 1506.
172. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986). For discussion of the holding in this case, see supra notes
70-80 and accompanying text.
173. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(2)).
174. Id.
175. In Merrell, the agency was the EPA and the authorizing statute was the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
176. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1503 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1625 at 13-14, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9463, 9464).
177. Id.
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chinery that Congress designed to . . .[address the needs of endan178
gered species].”
The second rationale for the Ninth Circuit’s decision was its conclusion that NEPA does not apply to “federal actions that conserve
the environment.” To support this conclusion, the court cited a Supreme Court case holding that “NEPA does not require the agency
to assess every impact or effect of its proposed action, but only the
179
It followed that if a proimpact or effect on the environment.”
posed action would not physically “impact or affect” the environment, then there was no need to comply with NEPA. To the Ninth
Circuit, it was manifestly apparent that “critical habitat designation
does not threaten” the kind of “environmental damage” which
180
NEPA seeks to avoid. The critical habitat designation would simply “prevent human interference with the environment” and allow
the spotted owls’ forested habitat to “shift, change, and evolve as it
181
does naturally.”
The court’s third and final rationale—that “ESA furthers the
goals of NEPA without demanding an EIS”—was nothing more than
a recitation of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and conclusions in Pacific
Legal Foundation. In fact, the Ninth Circuit used this opportunity to
cite extensively from the Sixth Circuit’s opinion and remark, “[w]e
think the analysis [in Pacific Legal Foundation] applies directly to the
182
facts of the case before us.” The court quickly summarized and approved of each element in the Sixth Circuit’s decision and concluded
that, taken together, the several parts of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis
indicated that “to apply NEPA to the ESA would further the pur183
poses of neither.”
2. Catron County v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. Less than one
year after the Ninth Circuit ruled that NEPA does not apply to
designations of critical habitat, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case presenting the
identical issue. The litigants in Board of Commissioners of Catron
184
County v. FWS
disagreed about NEPA’s applicability to a
178. Id. (quoting Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779).
179. Id. at 1505 (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460
U.S. 766, 772 (1983)).
180. Id. at 1506 n.13.
181. Id. at 1506.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1507.
184. 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996).
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185

designation of critical habitat for two species of threatened fish.
The government, seeking to defend its critical habitat designation,
argued that the displacement rationale set forth in Douglas County
186
should be adopted as law in the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit did not agree. The court acknowledged that
the ESA’s critical habitat provisions “to some extent parallel and
187
perhaps overlap the requirements imposed by NEPA.” The court
further conceded that “the ESA requirements for notice and environmental consideration partially fulfill the primary purposes of
188
However, the court flatly declared that “[p]artial fulfillNEPA.”
ment of NEPA’s requirements . . . is not enough” to justify an exemption from NEPA, because the “plain language” of that statute makes
it clear that agencies must comply with its procedural requirements
189
“to the fullest extent possible.”
The Tenth Circuit based its holding on policy concerns as well as
rules of statutory interpretation. The court thought it significant that
the purposes of NEPA are distinguishable from the goals of the ESA.
While the former statute is intended to “inform the Secretary of the
environmental consequences of his action” and “informs the public
190
that the acting agency has considered those consequences,” the lat191
ter strives to “prevent the extinction of species.” Although the protection of endangered species and their habitat is generally considered to be beneficial to the environment, the court stressed that
“[agency] action under ESA is not inevitably beneficial or immune to

185. In its original listing and designation proposal, the FWS had determined that it was not
required to comply with NEPA as a matter of law. See 50 Fed. Reg. 25,385, 25,395 (1985). At
the time, Pacific Legal Foundation was still the primary authority on this question. However,
the final critical habitat designation was delayed until April, 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 10,898
(loach minnow), id. at 10,906 (spikedace) (1994). The County filed its petition for injunctive
relief at that time—after Douglas County v. Lujan had been decided, but before it had been
reversed by the Ninth Circuit. For a discussion of the Douglas County cases, see supra notes
165-182 and accompanying text.
186. See Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1437 (citing Appellant’s Brief).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)). The Tenth Circuit was not persuaded that
“congressional failure to reverse or revise prior judicial and [executive] announcements of
NEPA noncompliance evidences congressional endorsement of such noncompliance,” because
there was no evidence that Congress contemplated, or was even aware, of the Interior Department’s policy of noncompliance. See id. at 1438. Moreover, the theory that Congress had silently acquiesced to Interior Department regulations was undercut by the fact that Congress
had not revisited the statutory provisions subjected to the administrative interpretation. See id.
190. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1437.
191. Id.
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192

improvement by compliance with NEPA procedure.” Compliance
with NEPA, the court felt, would in some cases help the FWS protect
endangered species and ensure that its actions would not have unintended environmental consequences.
III. ANALYSIS
In the past twenty years, Congress has amended the Endangered
193
In no instance has it explicitly stated
Species Act four times.
whether NEPA applies to listing decisions or critical habitat designa194
Nor has Congress ever stated
tions under section 4 of the ESA.
whether it intended NEPA to apply to other detailed statutory provisions which could fairly be characterized as protecting or enhancing
the environment. Because Congress has not chosen to make such a
statement, and because NEPA’s legislative history is so ambiguous,
the courts have had to divine congressional intent from the underlying policies of both NEPA and other substantive environmental stat195
utes. The courts, in effect, have had to weigh competing policy objectives and try to decide “what answer the legislature would have
made as to a problem that was neither discussed nor contem196
plated.”
Given the inherent subjectivity of this judicial task, it should not
be surprising that the courts have failed to achieve consensus on the
question of whether NEPA applies to federal actions taken pursuant
to section 4 of the Endangered Species Act. However, the question
of NEPA’s relation to the ESA will almost certainly confront other
federal courts in the future. The courts may also be called upon to
consider NEPA’s relation to other federal actions which can be characterized as “protecting” or “enhancing” the environment. It is
worthwhile, therefore, to analyze the conflicting authority which will
be presented to those courts and to determine if some policy concerns are more valid than others. In the following analysis, I argue
that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Douglas County is based on an un192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. See Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978); Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982);
Pub. L. No. 99-659, 100 Stat. 3706 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 (1988).
194. In contrast, Congress did explicitly state that NEPA would not apply to exemptions
granted by the Endangered Species Committee. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(k) (“An exemption decision by the Committee under this section shall not be a major Federal action for purposes of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.”).
195. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297-98 (1970) (“[C]ourts should endeavor to
give statutory language that meaning that nurtures the policies underlying the legislation.”).
196. Id. at 380.
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convincing analysis. In so doing, I implicitly endorse the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Catron County.
A. The NEPA Exemption for Nondiscretionary Agency Actions
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pacific Legal Foundation and the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Douglas County were both premised to
some extent on the idea that NEPA does not apply to nondiscretion197
To the extent that
ary duties imposed on an agency by statute.
NEPA is intended to inform an agency’s decision-making process,
such a rule is appropriate because it eliminates an administrative
burden which could by law have no effect on the agency’s decision.
The trouble with a broad exemption for nondiscretionary actions is
that it is constructed on the dubious premise that an EIS serves only
to inform the discretion of the action agency. This premise ignores
the informational value of the EIS to other government officials and
to stakeholders affected by agency action; and in so doing, it conflicts
198
with established NEPA case law.
Even if one were to accept a broad NEPA exemption for non199
discretionary agency action as a general matter, the Ninth Circuit
should not have found such an exemption to apply to critical habitat
designations. Unlike a listing decision, critical habitat designations
always involve a large measure of agency discretion. The ESA requires that the Fish and Wildlife Service determine the extent of a
species’ critical habitat by balancing the needs of the species with
200
Agency discretion is fur“economic and other relevant factors.”
ther amplified by provisions which state that critical habitat must be
201
It
designated only “to the extent prudent and determinable.”
would be difficult to imagine a situation in which an agency has more
discretion. Considering that the courts have been skeptical of agencies which claim to be exempt from NEPA because of statutory restrictions on their discretion and have typically construed agency

197. See Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that “Congress has not given the
Secretary the discretion to consider environmental factors, other than those directly related to
the preservation of the species”), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996); Pacific Legal Found. v.
Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1981) (emphasizing that “[t]he Secretary does not have the
discretion to consider the five factors required to be considered in filing an impact statement”).
198. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 156 and accompanying
text.
199. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Such an exemption now appears to be firmly
entrenched in the case law.
200. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
201. Id. § 1533(a)(3).
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202

enabling statutes to avoid such conflicts, it would be an unwarranted departure from legal precedent to find that the Fish and
Wildlife Service has so little discretion in making critical habitat designations that it need not comply with NEPA.
B. The Flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s “Displacement” Rationale
In holding that NEPA does not apply to critical habitat designations, the Ninth Circuit did not rely solely, or even primarily, on the
exemption for nondiscretionary agency actions. Instead, the court
decided that the statutory provisions which govern critical habitat
203
There is no doubt
designations had displaced NEPA altogether.
that Congress can modify the procedures by which an agency promulgates regulations if it wishes to do so. Likewise, it can exempt an
agency from procedures imposed by an earlier Congress. The important question in Douglas County, however, was whether the Congress
which adopted revisions to the ESA in 1978 actually intended to
make NEPA inapplicable to critical habitat designations.
The Ninth Circuit’s argument that Congress intended the critical habitat provisions to “displace” NEPA is not convincing. The
court cited scant legislative history to support this view, noting only
that House committee members wished to introduce some
“flexibility” into the critical habitat designation process:
The [committee] report states that “the legislation aims to
improve the listing process and the public notice process”
ensuring that the Secretary only makes a critical habitat
designation “after a thorough survey of all the204available
data” and after notice to the affected communities.
The fact that the critical habitat revisions were meant to “improve”
the listing process hardly suggests that Congress intended NEPA to
be inapplicable. In fact, the committee’s express desire to have critical habitat designations based on “all available data”—including,
presumably, data on possible environmental impacts—suggests exactly the opposite. Other statements in the legislative history, glibly

202. The Ninth Circuit, for example, rejected the Bonneville Power Administration’s argument that it could offer long term power contracts without complying with NEPA because it
had no discretion with respect to contract terms. See Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d
677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that contrary to agency assertions, “[t]he content of these contract provisions is not mandated but is clearly discretionary”).
203. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
204. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14) (1978).
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dismissed by the Ninth Circuit, likewise suggest that Congress did not
205
intend to make NEPA inapplicable to critical habitat designations.
Not surprisingly, then, the Ninth Circuit’s displacement rationale
seems to rely less on particular statements in the legislative history
than on the court’s feeling that the overall structure of the ESA’s
critical
habitat
designation
procedures
renders
NEPA
206
“superfluous.” Indeed, the court went to great lengths to point out
that the critical habitat designation procedures serve many of
207
However, such overlap, while releNEPA’s functions and goals.
vant to a functional equivalence analysis, is not an adequate basis for
208
a displacement exemption. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Merrell, the displacement rationale is constructed upon differences—not
209
similarities—between an enabling act and NEPA. The practical effect of the displacement rationale as it is laid out in Douglas County
is essentially to replace functional equivalence analysis with a much
less demanding legal rule that recognizes a NEPA exemption whenever an agency’s enabling statute replicates some (but not necessarily
all) of NEPA’s functions.
Such a rule is not only undesirable, it is unworkable, because it
has no logical boundaries. The ESA’s critical habitat provisions certainly can’t be set apart from other environmental statutes on the basis that they incorporate “disparate points of view,” or that they seek
to achieve their policy objectives through the use of “delicate machinery.” Every environmental statute is forged through political debate and tempered with compromise. To recognize a NEPA exemption for an agency whose enabling legislation was created through
“compromise” would be to effectively exempt all agency action. The
effect of the displacement rationale would be to destroy the presumption that NEPA’s procedures apply to all major federal actions and
replace it with a presumption that agencies are to consider environmental factors in a manner prescribed ad-hoc by each separate piece

205. See, e.g., H. Conf. Rep. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 27 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9494 (requiring that affected local governments receive actual notice of the
critical habitat designation and “any environmental assessment or environmental impact
statement”); Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1483 (D. Or. 1992) (relying on Senate debate on the 1978 amendments as evidence of Congress’s intent to require NEPA compliance).
206. Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1503.
207. See id. at 1503-04.
208. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit expressly disavowed
any functional equivalence analysis. See Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1504 n.10.
209. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
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of enabling legislation. Of course, the Ninth Circuit might try to
avoid absurd results through a judicious and sparing application of its
rule. But unless the court devised some reasoned method to distinguish “normal” enabling statutes from their more “delicate” counterparts, its rule would draw arbitrary distinctions between federal
agencies .
C. A NEPA Exemption for Environmentally “Benevolent” Agency
Actions?
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Douglas County also followed the
Sixth Circuit’s suggestion that NEPA should not apply to “federal ac210
tions that conserve the environment.” The problem with creating a
broad exemption for “benevolent” federal action is that there is no
way to determine, absent a thorough examination of a proposed action’s environmental impacts, to what extent that action would in fact
“conserve” the environment, and to what extent it might harm the
environment.
The first and most obvious difficulty with a broad NEPA exemption for “benevolent” federal actions is that such an exemption would
invite agencies to disingenuously characterize their actions as
“benevolent” in order to avoid the administrative burdens of complying with NEPA. The D.C. Circuit recognized long ago that a
broad NEPA exemption for agencies charged with protecting the environment “embrace[s] the endemic question of ‘Who shall police the
211
Even NEPA’s original sponsors were skeptical about
police’?”
proceeding on the assumption that EPA “will always be the good
212
213
guy.” Such concern has at times seemed well founded. That as210. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Pacific Legal
Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that NEPA is inapplicable to agencies “charged solely with protecting the environment”).
211. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
212. Id. at 384 (quoting Senator Jackson 118 Cong. Rec. 16878 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1972)).
Senator Jackson went on to note, “Since EPA was formed, they have done an admirable job
and they are continuing to do so, at least for present. However, it cannot be forgotten that
EPA is a regulatory agency and in the past in Washington almost all regulatory agencies have
eventually come under the control of those that they are charged with regulating.” Id. (quoting
Sen. Jackson 118 Cong. Rec. at 16887).
213. For example, the term served by EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford. See
Norman J. Vig, Presidential Leadership and the Environment: From Reagan and Bush to Clinton, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 71, 77 (Norman J.
Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds. 1994) (noting that Burford was one of several “ideological conservatives” appointed by President Reagan, and that “[v]irtually all of these appointees came from
the business corporations to be regulated or from the legal foundations or firms that had fought
environmental regulations for years;”); Riley E. Dunlap & Angela G. Mertig, The Evolution of
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sumption is equally suspect for other agencies charged with protecting the environment.
The argument against a broad NEPA exemption for
“benevolent” federal actions does not rest solely on the assumption
that an agency may disingenuously stray from its statutory mandate.
In fact, the greater concern is the well-intentioned agency which too
hastily characterizes an action as “benevolent” without considering
the action’s full range of environmental impacts. This concern is especially relevant for land management agencies such as the Bureau of
Land Management and the Forest Service, which must administer
multi-use statutes. The Forest Service, for example, might consider a
timber sale to be “benevolent” if it was conducted to protect healthy
214
trees from diseased ones. But as the Tenth Circuit bluntly noted,
215
“[m]erely because the Secretary says does not make it so.” The action cannot be fairly characterized as benevolent until all of its environmental impacts have been documented.
Admittedly, many problems could be avoided by limiting the
NEPA exemption to those actions which are intended to improve environmental quality and which entail no direct, physical modification
of the environment. Even under such a rule, however, it is not clear
that a critical habitat designation should be exempted from NEPA,
because a critical habitat designation arguably prohibits or restricts
216
actual land uses, and has actual impact on management regimes. In
the case of critical habitat designations, compliance with NEPA can
potentially improve agency decision-making by ensuring that the
agency action does not create unintended environmental damage.
NEPA compliance may also improve implementation by informing
stakeholders of an action’s full range of environmental impacts.

the U.S. Environmental Movement from 1970 to 1990: An Overview, in AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, 1970-1990 at 1, 4 (Riley E. Dunlap
& Angela G. Mertig eds., 1992) (noting that the “anti-environmental orientation of [the Reagan] administration . . . [was] highlighted by Department of Interior Secretary [James] Watt
and Environmental Protection Agency Director Gorsuch”).
214. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1989). The
plaintiffs in that case challenged the adequacy of an EA that the Forest Service prepared prior
to selling 6 million board feet of beetle-infested timber. The sale was spurred by an infestation
of bark beetles which killed some twenty million board feet of timber in a mixed-use area of
the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area. The court did not question NEPA’s obvious applicability to the timber sale. See id. at 1421-22. Under a broad exemption for “benevolent”
federal action, the court would presumably have to consider that threshold issue.
215. Catron County Board of Comm’rs v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996).
216. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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More generally, actions intended to benefit the environment
may have undesirable secondary effects—effects that might go unnoticed without the benefit of NEPA compliance. As one court has acknowledged, an agency charged with protecting the environment
“might wear blinders when promulgating standards protecting one
217
resource as to the effects on other resources.” Efforts to control air
218
Other
pollution, for example, might increase water pollution.
commentators have pointed out that “some of the most wellintentioned efforts to reduce identified risks can turn out to increase
other risks,” and have urged federal regulatory agencies to systemati219
cally consider these types of “risk-risk tradeoffs.”
An example might illustrate the point. Consider a designation of
critical habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis
(Veiellot)). This bird nests and breeds only in old growth pine trees,
in several habitat types including one known as longleaf pine sa220
221
vanna. This critically endangered ecosystem type is dependent on
fire, and left unmanaged, it burns regularly. A recovery plan intended to “conserve” nesting and breeding grounds for the woodpecker might prevent human management, including fire suppression, in designated critical habitat areas. As a result, naturally
occurring fires would be allowed to burn. These fires might help restore the longleaf pine savanna, and therefore benefit the redcockaded woodpecker. But the fires might also have a detrimental
effect on other natural resources, especially if fire suppression has
been a part of the area’s management regime for a significant period
of time. For instance, the fire might destroy valuable timber stands
and adversely impact other wildlife resources. To be sure, the benefits of preserving the woodpecker and its habitat might outweigh
these secondary costs. But that does not mean that the federal

217. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (3d Cir. 1973).
218. See Portland Cement, 486 F. 2d at 384 (making such a claim).
219. See generally John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 1
(John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
220. For a description of the nesting and breeding habits of the red-cockaded woodpecker,
see RED-COCKADED WOODPECKER: RECOVERY, ECOLOGY, AND MANAGEMENT (David L.
Kulhavy, et. al. eds., 1995); see also Chuck D. Barlow, The Proposed Management of the RedCockaded Woodpecker in the Southern National Forests: Analysis and Suggestions, 17 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 727 (1995).
221. See Norman L. Christensen et. al., Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOL. APPLICATIONS 665, 690
(1996) (defining as critically endangered those ecosystem types which have declined more than
98% since European settlement).
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agency proposing an environmentally “benevolent” action should
necessarily be excused from recognizing and documenting those secondary effects, and perhaps taking steps to ameliorate them. And it
is at least imaginable that there will be some instances where the
costs of the secondary effects outweigh the benefits of the proposed
action.
The Ninth Circuit has itself acknowledged that “[a]n agency
cannot … avoid its statutory responsibilities under NEPA merely by
asserting that an activity it wishes to pursue will have an insignificant
222
effect on the environment.” An agency should likewise not be able
to avoid its NEPA responsibilities merely by characterizing its proposed action as environmentally benevolent. After all, such an assertion cannot be forthrightly made (or judicially evaluated) until the
agency makes a detailed description of the proposed action’s likely
environmental impacts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some courts and commentators have worried that NEPA compliance might unduly delay or hinder federal efforts to protect the
223
environment. Although this concern is not frivolous, especially in
the context of critical habitat designations, neither is it an adequate
justification to exempt presumably benevolent federal actions from
NEPA’s requirements.
There is good reason to worry about increasing the time and cost
of designating critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act.
Even without the burden of complying with NEPA, the FWS has had
224
trouble fulfilling its duties under section 4 of the ESA. In light of
222. Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Steamboaters v. FERC,
759 F.2d 1382, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985)).
223. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 1981) (“This court
is reluctant to make NEPA more of an obstructionist tactic to prevent environment-enhancing
action than it may already have become.”); Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1508 (9th
Cir. 1995) (quoting same); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (noting that “[t]he need . . . for unusually expeditious decision would be thwarted by a
NEPA impact statement requirement” and that “opponents of environmental protection would
use the issue of [NEPA] compliance . . . as a tactic of litigation and delay”). See also Woody,
supra note 19, at 1 (noting that industry proponents have attempted to invoke NEPA “to undermine environmental protection”).
224. Although the FWS has listed several hundred species under the ESA, thousands more
await listing and protection. A number of species have gone extinct while waiting to be listed.
See Houck, supra note 115, at 286 (citing Nature Conservancy Study). The FWS has been even
more recalcitrant in designating critical habitat. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104, at 26 (finding that the FWS had neither designated nor proposed critical habitat
for 546 of 651 listed species).
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the Service’s past performance, one might rightfully pause before imposing further administrative burdens on the habitat designation
process. When a species is threatened with imminent extinction, it is
imperative that the FWS implement protective measures promptly.
Failure to do so may result in the irreversible loss of the species.
As a legal matter, however, it is clear that that NEPA’s potential
to delay federal action is not an adequate basis for an exemption.
The earliest case law states unequivocally that “considerations of
administrative difficulty, delay, or economic cost will not suffice” to
225
excuse an agency from NEPA’s requirements. After all, the very
purpose of NEPA is to delay action until the environmental impacts
of that action have been thoroughly examined.
From a policy standpoint, there is little reason to believe that the
delay and expense of NEPA compliance will bring critical habitat
designations or other benevolent federal actions to a grinding halt.
First, it is far from clear that FWS has failed to designate critical
226
Second, in those cases where
habitats due to a lack of resources.
agency officials and stakeholders do not identify secondary environmental impacts, FWS should be able to satisfy NEPA’s requirements
227
by preparing an EA rather than a full-blown EIS. Third, standing
requirements will help ensure that NEPA is not abused by industry
228
proponents. Finally, if FWS needed to designate critical habitat for

225. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm’n v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
226. See Houck, supra note 115, at 302-07 (arguing that FWS has for political reasons overrelied on the “prudency” exemption to designating critical habitat).
227. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
228. Litigants cannot gain standing unless their claim falls within the “zone of interests”
NEPA was intended to protect. Because NEPA’s purpose is to protect the environment, economic arguments will presumably not confer standing. See Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S
Forest Service, 8 F 3d. 713 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs do not have standing under
NEPA to protect purely economic interests). Of course, a litigant could allege environmental
injuries and invoke NEPA to delay an agency rulemaking, even though its primary motivation
is economic rather than ecological. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court most recently elaborated on the zone of interests test in Bennett v.
Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1996) (holding that two irrigation districts and two ranch operators have
standing under the Endangered Species Act to challenge the validity of a jeopardy opinion issued by the FWS). It is not clear what effect Bennett will have on the zone of interests test in
the context of NEPA litigation. Whether or not a particular plaintiff will have standing will
depend upon how formally the courts construe NEPA’s zone of interests. Bennett makes clear
that standing hinges on the “particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.” The
substantive portion at issue in Bennett was section 7 of the ESA, which contains language
which the Court interpreted to protect interests beyond preservation of species. Because
NEPA contains no directly comparable language, Bennett does not necessarily extend NEPA’s
zone of interests to encompass party economic interests.

Spring 1998]

NEPA FOR THE GANDER

385

a species in immediate danger of extinction, it could presumably
229
qualify for an emergency exemption to NEPA.
In short, the costs of NEPA compliance are not insurmountable.
The benefits of NEPA compliance, on the other hand, may be significant. In the context of critical habitat designations, the benefit is that
the FWS will consider the secondary environmental impacts of any
anticipated changes in land management in the designated areas. In
so doing, the FWS will move closer to the ideal of ecosystem man230
agement. In the context of other “benevolent” federal actions, the
benefit is assurance that federal resource agencies will comply with
Congress’ command to consider all of the environmental impacts of
their actions “to the fullest extent possible,” and make risk tradeoffs
accordingly. NEPA compliance may promote ecosystem management by providing an opportunity for the FWS to consider complexity, connectedness, and context during the critical habitat designation
process.

229. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (allowing noncompliance “[w]here emergency circumstances
make it necessary”).
230. Ecosystem management is “management driven by explicit goals . . . and made adaptable by monitoring and research based on our best understanding of the ecological interactions
and processes necessary to sustain ecosystem composition, structure and function.” Christensen et. al., supra note 222, at 665. One important principle of ecosystem management is the
“importance of ecosystem complexity and the vast array of interconnections that underlie ecosystem function.” Id. at 669. Another is recognition that ecosystems and their constituent
components are “very much affected by the status and behavior of the systems or landscape
that surrounds them.” Id.
It is increasingly apparent that ecosystem management is not a passing fad. No fewer than
18 federal agencies currently aspire to integrate the principles of ecosystem management into
their policymaking and implementation activities. See id. at 668. The FWS has been among
the most active proponents of the concept. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: AN APPROACH TO MORE
EFFICIENTLY CONSERVE THE NATION’S BIODIVERSITY (1994). The law reviews are also full of
articles encouraging this approach to resource management. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the
Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1997); George Frampton, Environmental Law Faces the New Ecology: Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administration, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39 (1997); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary
Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994).
Current proposals to overhaul the critical habitat designation process would similarly enhance the FWS’s ability to consider ecosystem-wide concerns. See, e.g., S. 1180, 105th Cong.
(1997) (repealing the requirement that the Secretary designate critical habitat at the time of
listing, and allowing the Secretary to determine critical habitat during the development of a
final recovery plan).

